The Issues
McChrystal must find a way to turn around the eight-year-old Afghan conflict that some observers call a “must-win” for Washington. He argues that his top priority is securing the safety of civilians, thus isolating the Taliban.
"Although I expect stiff fighting ahead, the measure of effectiveness will not be enemy killed. It will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence," he said, pointing to the need for rapid growth in the Afghan police and Army.
In August 2009, McChrystal concluded that the situation in Afghanistan requires a new approach. Success, he said, depends on the U.S. becoming more involved in the country. In the next several years, McChrystal plans to expand Afghan security forces and an accelerate their training and unify the effort of American allies like Britain, Canada, Germany and France.
He also called for an end to air strikes except under the most dire circumstances.
"This is a struggle for the support of the Afghan people. Our willingness to operate in ways that minimize casualties or damage — even when doing so makes our task more difficult — is essential to our credibility," McChrystal said. "I cannot overstate my commitment to the importance of this concept."
Afghanistan
In a confidential 66-page memosent to Defense Secretary Gates in August 2009, McChrystal warned of "failure" if U.S. forces did not significantly increase their presence in the Afghan theater over the next year.
Much of McChrystal's view was vindicated when President Obama announced in December 2009 that he would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, though he conditioned the increase on those troops beginning to come home by mid-2011.
McChrystal's strategy was predicated on the idea that the U.S. needed to wage an intensive ground war. "The insurgency has to have access to the people ... so we literally want to go in there and squat among the people," he said. "There will be a lot of fighting ... if we do this right, the insurgents will have to fight us. They will have no choice."
McChrystal also believes that his effort must show results by the end of 2010. "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible," McChrystal said.
McChrystal's memo described a robust Taliban insurgency, which is turning to jails for recruits, and an Afghan government crippled by corruption. McChrystal argues the increase in U.S. troops would be used to protect Afghan civilians rather than killing insurgents.
"Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. . . . The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves," he said.
Pat Tillman Death
McChrystal played a role in the controversial aftermath of the much-publicized death of former NFL player and Cpl. Pat Tillman in Afghanistan on April 24, 2004. Tillman made headlines when he forfeited a multimillion dollar football contract with the Arizona Cardinals to join the Army after Sept. 11. His friendly-fire death was initially covered up.
Tillman’s family alleges that McChrystal, who was then head of the JSOC, helped cover up the manner of Tillman’s death. Following McChrystal’s nomination, it didn’t take long for reporters to find Tillman’s father. The Associated Press wrote two days after Gates’ announcement: “In a brief interview with The Associated Press, Pat Tillman Sr. accused Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal of covering up the circumstances of the 2004 slaying. ‘I do believe that guy participated in a falsified homicide investigation,’ Pat Tillman Sr. said. Separately, Mary Tillman called it ‘imperative’ that McChrystal's record be carefully considered before he is confirmed.”
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell told the AP, “’We feel terrible for what the Tillman family went through, but this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal.’”
“P-4” Memo
McChrystal did send the controversial “P-4” memo to U.S. Central Command chief Gen. John Abizaid, and others, warning the commanders that an Army investigation might well conclude that Tillman was killed by friendly fire. McChrystal was concerned that the president and/or the secretary of the Army might misspeak about Tillman’s cause of death when he was posthumously awarded the Silver Star citation.
“I felt that it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our country's leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death become public,” McChrystal wrote on April 29, 2004, to his superiors