Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal

Current Position: Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (since June 2009)
Credit: U.S. military

 

Why He Matters

The Afghan war against the Taliban and al Qaeda elements is a complex one, the kind that requires new thinking and “new approaches,” Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated in May 2009.Bennett, John T., DefenseNews.com

To fight a stepped-up war against insurgents in Afghanistan, Obama's Pentagon needed someone who had, say, commanded one of the military’s most elite units in counterinsurgency missions in Iraq. They concluded that man was Army Gen. McChrystal, the one-time forward commander of the Pentagon’s secretive U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

As head of JSOC, McChrystal was credited with the June 2006 apprehension (and death) of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. But the Army general has also been involved in controversy; he was accused, by family members, of helping to cover up the 2004 friendly-fire killing in Afghanistan of NFL-player and then- Army Ranger Cpl. Pat Tillman.

mcchrystal with obama c wh.jpgIn August 2009, McChrystal submitted a 66-page memoCOMISAF's Initial Assessment, Unclassified Version published Sept. 21, 2009 in the Washington Post to Gates contending that a U.S. troop increase in Afghanistan over the ensuing year was necessary or the mission "will likely result in failure."Woodward, Bob, The Washington Post, "McChrystal: More Forces of 'Mission Failure,' Sept. 21, 2009

In December 2009, the general got most of what he wanted when President Obama ordered 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, while simultaneously ordering that they start coming home in mid-2011. Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, The New York Times, Obama Adds Troops, Maps Exit Plan, Dec. 1, 2009

Path to Power

The new Afghanistan commander nominee was born into a military family on Aug. 14, 1954. His father was a two-star general and served in Germany during the post-World War II occupation, followed by a stint at the Pentagon.

Herbert McChrystal’s  service became a family tradition. All six of his children, including Stanley, would join the military or marry into it. “They're all pretty intense,” Judy McChrystal, one of Stanley’s sisters-in-law, recently told Elisabeth Bumiller and Mark Mazzetti of the New York Times.Bumiller, Elisabeth and Mazzetti, Mark, New York Times via San Diego Union TribuneStanley attended West Point, graduating in 1976. He then started his Army career in typical fashion, with various infantry regiments.

U.S. Army Special Forces
In 1978, his career took a crucial turn when he headed to Ft. Bragg, N.C., for the officer course at U.S. Special Forces School. About six years later, he was named commander of Detachment A, A Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). The early 1980s put McChrystal in several intelligence and training posts in Korea and Ft. Benning, Ga. The late 1980s saw McChrystal in a number of posts in the Army’s elite Ranger community. He also completed the Command and Staff Course at the Naval War College.

The 1990s solidified McChrystal as an operational commander, as he presided over a number of Ranger units. He also deployed to the Iraqi theater during Operation Desert Storm. Theelite operator also excelled in academics, completing studies in the late 1990s at both the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Council of Foreign Relations.

In June 2001, McChrystal served as chief of staff to both the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps and the service’s Ft. Bragg, N.C. operations, which included a stint as chief of staff of  the Combined Joint Task Force 180 during the first stages of fighting in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. From there, McChrystal did his first of two Pentagon tours, as vice director of operations on the Joint Staff.

JSOC

From September 2003 through August 2008, McChrystal served as commander of the super-secret Joint Special Operations Command/Joint Special Operations Command Forward (JSOC). McChrystal led the charge to nab several high-profile U.S. foes in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein in December 2003 and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, in June 2006.Bowden, Mark, The Atlantic, “The Ploy,” May 2007In August 2008, Mullen made him director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.

But his elite troops were criticized in various media reports for employing harsh interrogation tactics as part of Task Force 6-26, a group of top secret commandos who questioned terrorist suspects at Camp Nama located at Baghdad International Airport. There are allegations that the unit’s commanders didn’t do enough to stop and punish abusive questioning techniques.Schmitt, Eric and Marshall, Carolyn, The New York Times, "In Secret Unit's 'Black Room,' a Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse," March 19, 2006

The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward reported that JSOC was partially responsible for the reduction of violence in Iraq around the time of the 2007 troop surge. Woodward pointed to top-secret JSOC operations to “locate, target and kill” key Sunni, Shiite and Al-Qaeda players. “JSOC is awesome,” President George W. Bush said when asked about its impact on the Iraq theater.Woodward, Bob, The Washington Post, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn't Just the Surge,” Sept. 8, 2008

In May 2009, Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen chose McChrystal to replace former Gen. David McKiernan.

In Their Own Words

"This is a struggle for the support of the Afghan people. Our willingness to operate in ways that minimize casualties or damage — even when doing so makes our task more difficult — is essential to our credibility," McChrystal said. "I cannot overstate my commitment to the importance of this concept."

The Issues

McChrystal must find a way to turn around the eight-year-old Afghan conflict that some observers call a “must-win” for Washington.The New York Times, Editorial He argues that his top priority is securing the safety of civilians, thus isolating the Taliban. mcchrystal at white house c wh.jpg"Although I expect stiff fighting ahead, the measure of effectiveness will not be enemy killed. It will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence," he said, pointing to the need for rapid growth in the Afghan police and Army.MSNBC.com, The Associated Press, "General: War in Afghanistan is 'winnable'," June 2, 2009

In August 2009, McChrystal concluded that the situation in Afghanistan requires a new approach. Success, he said, depends on the U.S. becoming more involved in the country. In the next several years, McChrystal plans to expand Afghan security forces and an accelerate their training and unify the effort of American allies like Britain, Canada, Germany and France.Baker, Peter and Filkins, Dexter, "Groundwork is Laid for New Troops in Afghanistan," New York Times, Aug. 31, 2009

He also called for an end to air strikes except under the most dire circumstances.Filkins, Dexter, "Stanley McChrystal's Long War," New York Times Magazine, Oct. 18, 2009 

"This is a struggle for the support of the Afghan people. Our willingness to operate in ways that minimize casualties or damage — even when doing so makes our task more difficult — is essential to our credibility," McChrystal said. "I cannot overstate my commitment to the importance of this concept."MSNBC.com, The Associated Press, "General: War in Afghanistan is 'winnable'," June 2, 2009

Afghanistan

In a confidential 66-page memoCOMISAF's Initial Assessment, Unclassified Version published Sept. 21, 2009 in the Washington Post sent to Defense Secretary Gates in August 2009, McChrystal warned of "failure" if U.S. forces did not significantly increase their presence in the Afghan theater over the next year.Woodward, Bob, The Washington Post, "McChrystal: More Forces of 'Mission Failure,' Sept. 21, 2009

Much of McChrystal's view was vindicated when President Obama announced in December 2009 that he would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, though he conditioned the increase on those troops beginning to come home by mid-2011. Baker, Peter, The New York Times, "How Obama Came to Plan for 'Surge' in Afghanistan," Dec. 5, 2009

McChrystal's strategy was predicated on the idea that the U.S. needed to wage an intensive ground war. "The insurgency has to have access to the people ... so we literally want to go in there and squat among the people," he said. "There will be a lot of fighting ... if we do this right, the insurgents will have to fight us. They will have no choice."Filkins, Dexter, "Stanley McChrystal's Long War," New York Times Magazine, Oct. 18, 2009 

McChrystal also believes that his effort must show results by the end of 2010. "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible," McChrystal said.

McChrystal's memo described a robust Taliban insurgency, which is turning to jails for recruits, and an Afghan government crippled by corruption. McChrystal argues the increase in U.S. troops would be used to protect Afghan civilians rather than killing insurgents.Woodward, Bob, The Washington Post, "McChrystal: More Forces of 'Mission Failure,' Sept. 21, 2009

"Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. . . . The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves," he said.

Pat Tillman Death

McChrystal played a role in the controversial aftermath of the much-publicized death of former NFL player and Cpl. Pat Tillman in Afghanistan on April 24, 2004. Tillman made headlines when he forfeited a multimillion dollar football contract with the Arizona Cardinals to join the Army after Sept. 11. His friendly-fire death was initially covered up.Lewis, Neil, The New York Times, “Retired General Is Censured for Role in Tillman Case,” Aug. 1, 2007

Tillman’s family alleges that McChrystal, who was then head of the JSOC, helped cover up the manner of Tillman’s death. Following McChrystal’s nomination, it didn’t take long  for reporters to find Tillman’s father. The Associated Press wrote two days after Gates’ announcement: “In a brief interview with The Associated Press, Pat Tillman Sr. accused Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal of covering up the circumstances of the 2004 slaying. ‘I do believe that guy participated in a falsified homicide investigation,’ Pat Tillman Sr. said. Separately, Mary Tillman called it ‘imperative’ that McChrystal's record be carefully considered before he is confirmed.”Jakes, Lara, Associated Press

Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell told the AP, “’We feel terrible for what the Tillman family went through, but this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal.’”

“P-4” Memo

McChrystal did send the controversial “P-4” memo to U.S. Central Command chief Gen. John Abizaid, and others, warning the commanders that an Army investigation might well conclude that Tillman was killed by friendly fire. McChrystal was concerned that the president and/or the secretary of the Army might misspeak about Tillman’s cause of death when he was posthumously awarded the Silver Star citation.

“I felt that it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our country's leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death become public,” McChrystal wrote on April 29, 2004, to his superiorsLindlaw, Scott and Mendoza, Martha, The Associated Press via The Arizona Republican, “General’s Memo Voiced Doubts in Tillman’s Death,” Aug. 4, 2007

The Network

McChrystal landed the top military post in Afghanistan largely because of his working relationship with arguably the U.S. military’s most influential uniformed officials, Mullen and U.S. Central CommandChief Gen. David Petraeus.

It was Mullen who installed McChrystal in the powerful Joint Staff director post in August 2008. And when Mullen decided the Joint Staff should conduct a review of the Pentagon’s Afghanistan strategies a few months later, Mullen entrusted McChrystal to run it. “I've been privileged to work with him over the better part of the last year and seen … the broadness and the depth that go far beyond just high-end special-operations skills,” Mullen said in May 2009. “And I'm extremely confident that he will be able to carry out this mission in its fullness to include, obviously, those [special operations] skills, but others as well.”Defense Department, News Transcript

During his five-year run as Joint Special Operations Command boss, McChrystal worked closely with the widely-popular Petraeus, then the top American commander of the Iraq mission. While many credit Petraeus with remaking the military’s counter-insurgency approaches, Jeff Stein of Congressional Quarterly recalls a conversation with a senior military official that painted a different image. “According to my interlocutor, Petraeus, whom he had talked to hours earlier, gave complete credit for the counter-terror revolution to [McChrystal],” Stein wrote, “for developing and running the program, which is still shrouded in mystery.”Stein, Jeff, CQ Politics

Petraeus has called McChrystal a “brilliant” officer with “considerable experience in Afghanistan, in the conduct of irregular warfare, and in both conventional and special operations.”Unattributed, Stars and Stripes

Due in large part to his background in the shadowy world of special operations, which often include participation from non-defense agencies, McChrystal’s network extends beyond the military. Military officials say he has a deep rolodex of contacts inside the Central Intelligence Agency, FBI and other federal intelligence and national security outfits.
 

Campaign Contributions

According to the Center for Responsive Politics, McChrystal made no political donations between 1990 and 2008.
 

(photos courtesy White House photostream / Pete Souza)